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This symposium issue marks the fourth year of the New York Law School
Comparative Law and Politics Workshop Series, together with the fifth annual
conference of the U.S. Association of Constitutional Law, which co-sponsored the
instant conference on Perspectives on Post-Conflict Constitutionalism.
In recent years, the New York Law School Comparative Law and Politics
Workshop has been exploring globalism, conflict, and the rule of law from a comparative and interdisciplinary law and politics perspective. At present, there is
hardly a more pressing topic than the democratization project and its relationship
to the rule of law. In recent years, an important dimension of this inquiry is the
potential for constitutionalism and constitution-making in the advancement of
the rule of law in post-conflict situations. It is in this context that we convened
the instant conference on post-conflict constitutionalism, giving rise to this issue.
This symposium appears at a critical juncture in Iraq. Will the current
spiral of violence escalate to civil war and doom this experiment in democratization? Or, might the violence subside long enough to allow the forces of constitutionalism and rule of law to gain the upper hand?
Given the last half century’s legacies of transitional justice, one might expect
that fundamental political change would take some time, particularly given the
general absence of democratization in the region. Indeed, we were digging our
heels in for a long path of political development — the gradualism that characterizes transition, and the building and longstanding consolidation of democracy.
In this scholarly exchange on post-conflict constitutionalism, we had the
benefit of some of the finest minds in the areas of transitional democracy building,
comparative constitutionalism, and comparative politics. Each of the contributions to this symposium has a distinctive take on the risks and opportunities implied in post-conflict constitutionalism. The real question, one might say, is
whether the very notion of “post-conflict” can plausibly be applied to Iraq, in
light of what has happened on the ground since the convening of the conference.
This in turn leads to reflection on what one might call the continuum of conflict
— the sense that in contemporary conditions of conflict the classic threshold of
war and peace is becoming unstable and problematized. Nevertheless, the constitutional context was couched in the prevailing frameworks, while attempting
also to bring these to bear upon the current political realities both in the Middle
East and elsewhere.
The authors’ contributions explore the potential of the constitutional projects
launched in Afghanistan and Iraq through the diverse lenses of the authors’ particular interdisciplinary perspectives and expertise. A common ground lies in the
recognition of the immense daunting project that is underway, and all question
the direction of the road ahead, as well as the challenge posed for both politics and
law. The evaluation of Afghanistan may well be somewhat more optimistic at
the moment, given the security situation and riven state of Iraq.
The problem of legitimacy is pervasive: How does this play out for democratization in the Middle East? For Ulrich Preuss and Jean Cohen, the initial act
of coercive force taints legitimacy from the very start, while other authors, J.
458
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Alexander Thier and Andrew Arato, propose that other dimensions could confer
elements of legitimacy.
Preuss’ paper, Perspectives on Post-Conflict Constitutionalism, looks at
the potential and costs of regime change through “external constitutionalism.” By
this, he means: Constitutional processes imposed, or sponsored from the outside of
the country, are a form of interventionism of which he is highly skeptical.
Preuss gives historical, cultural, and political reasons of varying persuasiveness for his opposition to this constitutional project. Beginning with the historical
analogues that have been invoked in support of the contemporary project, Preuss
characterizes what he sees as a growing development, a paradigm of “constitutional interventionism,” that he associates with globalizing politics. Perhaps, not
surprisingly, the arguments for the constitutional reform of the Middle East often
recur to the post–World War II period and its related wave of constitutionalism
as the closest analogue.1 However, Preuss argues these are distinguishable from
the postwar precedents.
It would not be until the present moment, with the end of the Cold War and
the freeing of its hard political constraints, that political space has been liberated
for bold political projects, such as the democratization and constitutionalism in
the Middle East. Nevertheless, despite that space, Preuss offers reasons for why
the post–World War constitutions worked out; and, explores why, by the same
token, these may well fail to offer a basis for similar reform today in the Middle
East.
Preuss asks: What exactly is it that gives the German constitution, concededly initiated by occupation powers following a war and full defeat, its long
lasting legitimacy?2 What were the legitimacy-engendering processes? The answer, he puts forth, was, in great part, the involvement of the local populace in
the constitution-making processes.3 Then Preuss raises the objection of “culture”:
He asks whether the constitutionalism associated with the last century is largely a
“Euro-Atlantic” idea, which may not be apt to the contemporary project of harmonizing Islam with democratization.4 This said, he concludes by emphasizing
globalization as a continued trend; and the extent to which the growing interconnectedness of states puts pressure on constitutionalism and the constitution-making process.
Preuss ends by proposing an alternative to unilateral coercive action: the
involvement of the international community in post-conflict situations. For
Preuss, international participation offers a better space for the evolution of constitutional development in the new globalizing realm.
1.

See generally LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE

2.

Ulrich K. Preuss, Perspectives on Post-Conflict Constitutionalism, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 467
(2006–2007).

3.

See , e.g., P ETER MERKL, ORIGINS

4.

See NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL
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RIGHTS (1990).
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GERMAN REPUBLIC (1963).

OF THE

459

ISLAMIC STATE (forthcoming 2007).

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\51-3\NLR312.txt

unknown

Seq: 6

1-MAY-07

16:17

INTRODUCTION

The question is why? What gives these processes their legitimacy? Is it
their multilateralism? Does this adequately compensate for other flaws?
This turn to internationalism and its principles resonates with the approach
in this symposium pursued by Jean Cohen. Her paper, The Role of International Law in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making, raises the provocative
question of whether, at the current post–Cold War moment, the relevant paradigm might well draw, not from domestic constitutional law, and comparative
law and politics, but rather, from international law and, in particular, relate to
the post-conflict and occupation status and related law. To what extent might
the current political moment be characterized by the paradigm: from occupation
to imperial law?
This goes right to the heart of international law’s privileging of “preservation,” i.e., non-transformation, and, to what extent the current project of political and constitutional reform, under occupation as in Iraq, may well be at odds
with this non-transformation status quo-preserving view.
Indeed, the postwar period resulted in conventions that sought to commit to
international stability and, accordingly, resulted in norms that sought to guarantee the protection of the status quo. Therefore, it is not surprising that, with the
end of the Cold War and the lifting of its constraints, there has been a vital
revisiting of these norms. The last decade’s lifting of the hard political constraints
associated with the Cold War opened a space not merely for liberalization, but
also for ambitious political reform, and even forceful interventions, challenging
the normative commitments entrenched in the postwar conventions.
As a result, the contemporary constitutional projects in the Middle East and
Central Asia that are the subject of the symposium put pressure on the prevailing
normative and legal assumptions. For these projects appear to be predicated on
occupations that necessitate transformation, rather than the preservation of the
status quo, and, therefore, risk collision with prevailing presumptions on the legality and legitimacy of the initiation of forced change.
These two directions — of political preservation versus transformation —
appear normatively irreconcilable. Indeed, Cohen is critical of the project from
the get-go. Going further than Preuss or Arato, it appears she would argue that
these developments constitute a return to the imperialist project, and consequently
favors retaining the prevailing “conservation” principle to regulate contemporary
regime occupation.
Cohen’s view seems to be premised on the notion that nothing of any relevant significance has changed; accordingly, she would support retaining the current legal system. Her essay exhorts for perpetuating the postwar international
legal order.5

5.

Jean Cohen, The Role of International Law in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making, 51 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 497, 521 & n.119 (2006–2007).
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My own view is that it is not at all clear that the legal norms can or ought
to remain the same. Adhering to the preservationist view tends to idealize the
postwar institutions and principles of the prior century, though these, too, are
historically contingent, and reflect the political vicissitudes of their time. Moreover, in this regard, it is worth remembering that, even at the time, the norms
generated more than one commitment; beyond the state system, the postwar period also gave birth to a new recognition of international human rights. Accordingly, insofar as the postwar period generated diverse institutions and processes
devoted to the protection of these rights, this means that there is potential for
collision of these norms: of protection of state sovereignty on the one hand versus
the protection of individual rights.
Today’s challenges, then, are different from those of the postwar period. In
the present context, the protection of state sovereignty often vies with the protection of human and humanity rights. Deployed earlier in Kosovo and Rwanda,
the humanitarian logic may seem to break down once we get to the engagements
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless, while the humanitarian intervention
argument seems thin, in its application to contemporary situations, that does not
make it illusory or irrelevant as a general matter. For it seems clear that, in the
present, where post–Cold War politics are characterized by the potential for
greater engagement and even forceful interventionism, it may well not be an
answer to insist doggedly on adherence to state sovereignty as the preeminent
norm in international affairs. To what extent can insistence on this principle
adequately deal with the current contemporary phase of global politics?
Should there be a shift in the norm here, and to what extent? Will maintaining the “preservation principle” be less harmonious with current developments, particularly, given increasing emphasis in protecting individual human
rights as well as people’s humanity rights. For Cohen, changes in this direction
are simply conceived as at cross purposes — in her view, meaningful political
transformation must be initiated — not from outside the state — but by the
people themselves.6
Moreover, the further problem down the road is, to whatever extent the
prevailing principle of state sovereignty is changed, might that run the risk of
sending a green light to the project of occupation and transformation, that is, of
inviting a risky return to imperialism?
But isn’t this arguably just an instance of a much more common dilemma
associated with the complex meaning of rule of law during periods of political
flux, and the related difficulty of adherence to it in present circumstances. Wherever legal processes are tinkered with, this would reflect procedural irregularities,
but, would not per se render this bad law. The perception of legality would

6.

Id. at 525 & n.137.
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depend on whether there were other rule of law values being advanced at the
time, and the extent to which these on balance advance transitional rule of law.7
Turning now to Andrew Arato’s paper, Post-Sovereign ConstitutionMaking and its Pathologies in Iraq. Like Preuss, Andrew Arato’s contribution
to this symposium focuses on the issues raised by the role of constitution-making
in Iraq. As someone involved with theorizing constitutionalism as well with the
process on the ground, he lends a unique perspective on what went wrong.
Arato’s view of the project does not just depend on the politics of occupation
and the related coercion of the constitutional intervention, and so here he differs
from Preuss. For Arato, the mere fact of the externalization of the constitutional
impetus is not dispositive of the legitimacy of the constitutional project. Indeed,
he suggests that there are a number of successful examples of what he characterizes as “a post-sovereign paradigm,” a paradigm, as he defines it, characterized
by the absence of any one body that can authoritatively speak for the people.
Here, Arato makes a distinct proposal for a “post-sovereign” paradigm of
constitution-making, which includes: a multiple stage process, an interim constitution, and a freely elected, but non-sovereign constitutional assembly. These are
the elements, which in his view could lay the basis necessary for legitimacy.
One might say that Arato’s view reflects a liberal view of constitutionalism
where hopes are vested in the establishment of political processes and constitutional procedures.8 It is expected that constitutional processes are the path to
garnering legitimacy.
The notion of a “two-stage” process, which entails the disaggregating of different dimensions of constitution-making, is a child of the postwar experience,
where initial constitution drafting processes were not open to the public while the
subsequent stage was opened to a broader population, which became critical to the
legitimation of the constitution.
What might the above offer regarding Iraq, and the democratic project in
the Middle East? Not lessons — because of its political context — nor real analogies. Iraq raises squarely the question of to what extent can there be external
imposition or jumpstarting of democracy: normatively — what is the legitimacy
of this project? The problem arises out of the utter lack of the usual sources of
legitimacy: for the constitution could not draw its legitimacy from the occupation.
While the analogies are often made to postwar Germany and Japan, these postconflict constitutional projects stood in a different historical light. Consider the
postwar constitutions’, in Japan, known as the MacArthur constitution, relation
to military force. Like the postwar trials, these were forms of “victor’s justice,”
yet the term implies a certain relationship of law to power and an implied authority. Iraq even lacks the authority of victor’s justice and associated legitimacy.
7.

RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 11–26 (2000).

8.

For this view regarding constitutionalism, see generally Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term: Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 75–77 (1986).
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The Iraqi occupation reflects a different relation to military power — very little
sense of consent — and in this regard it is distinguishable from the postwar
constitutional project in Afghanistan.
Just when is the right time for a new constitution? Iraq raises the ongoing
problem of “sequencing.” That is, in situations of diminished legitimacy —
which ought to come first: constitutions or elections? Pursuant to the proposed
multistage model, as was to be exemplified in Iraq, the idea was that there ought
to be a two-stage process, first, involving the imposition of constitution drafting,
followed by a freely elected constitutional assembly.
Yet, ultimately, for Arato, beyond the theory, the “operationalization” of this
model in Iraq had its flaws. In its next part, Arato’s contribution goes on to
identify what he characterizes as “pathologies.”
In his paper, Arato begins first and foremost with the role and ongoing
dominance of the occupying power. That is, the absence of legality in the invasion, put pressure on the sense of legitimacy in the post-conflict period. Moreover, and related, is the destructive influence of the United States-occupying
regime, particularly, through the harsh sanctions applied against the Iraqi state
structures, and the extreme of de-Baathification, involving dissolution of the
Iraqi army, and police which would end up tragically destroying the very entities
that might have contributed some needed stability and legitimacy at the time of
the country’s constitutional processes.9
The tragic loss of legitimation through needless destruction of state entities
reflects the many errors of the occupation, and, in particular, the missteps as they
relate to transitional justice. The miscarriage of transitional justice, particularly
concerning the military, the police, and the civil service intersect and impact here,
negatively, with developments in transitional constitutionalism.10
Other errors involved the illegitimacy of processes excluding important minorities, such as the Sunni, from the “second phase” constitutional assembly,
which also contributed to the sense of domination from above, and a related lack
of legitimacy. All of which put pressure on the constitutional project.
Arato’s account in this issue of the multistage constitutional process in Iraq
illustrates just how difficult legitimacy is to achieve; while, conversely, just how
easy to lose. Vivid construction of transition is necessary to draw a clear line
distinguishing the past from the present. Yet, Iraq is also the symbol of a project.
It may well be too soon to tell whether dimensions of these processes may ultimately have any long-range positive democratizing influence. And, of course,
any evaluation might well depend on the parameters of the lens, and looking to
the country within the region as opposed to questions of change in one or other
9.

For elaboration upon this point, see Ruti Teitel, Milosevic and Hussein on Trial: The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL INTL. L.J. 837 (2005).

10. For the relation of administrative transitional justice and constitutional justice in political transition, see

TEITEL, supra note 7, at 149–50, 185–89.
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country. While the contributors to this issue emphasized the many different issues
implied in jumpstarting constitutionalism in regions where this would not have
been otherwise on the agenda, Alexander Thier’s contribution takes up yet another layer of issues which goes to the substantive role of constitutionalism in
Central Asia. Afghanistan’s in particular raises the substantive next-level set of
issues relating to constitutionalism and constitution-making.
Thier’s paper concedes the positive benefits of the process of constitutionmaking in Afghanistan. After all, just getting the representatives of such diverse
groups into one room constituted an enormous achievement and a landmark in
the country’s political life. Nevertheless, probing beyond the process, Thier highlights the fault lines in the constitution itself, in particular, issues concerning
functionality and accountability. In this regard, Thier suggests the constitution
presents the potential for ramifications threatening to the rule of law. He highlights problems relating to the separation of powers that relate both to the judiciary and to the executive. Here, the Supreme Court’s independence is of
particular importance given the new authority that it has been given to interpret
Islam.
An added troubling issue goes to the establishment of a presidential system
in Afghanistan and its consequences for the rule of law. As experiences in Latin
America over the last century reflect, presidentialist systems have, as a rule,
presented challenges for checks and balances in states with weak democratic systems and therefore have been vulnerable to corruption. Therefore, in weak democracies, establishing a presidential system can create significant problems for
political consolidation, as well as for the ultimate establishment of a rule of law
system.
Moreover, there are also issues presented by the concentration of power in
unstable systems, reflected in the new constitution’s attempt to centralize power,
against the backdrop of the provinces. This constitutional structure risks subverting processes of power sharing and negotiation.
Last, but not least, are questions regarding the contemplated role for Islam
in the new constitution. More than before, Islam has been, in Thier’s view,
“thoroughly incorporated” into the new Afghani constitution which requires that
laws not conflict with the “beliefs” and “provisions” of Islam.11 Of even more
concern, the power to interpret what this means lies with the Supreme Court, an
unelected and therefore politically unaccountable body. The risks this structure
raises are not only of assigning too great a power to the religious, and destabilizing the country along sectarian lines; but, also of fomenting a lack of accountability in an already unstable political system. This could threaten the processes
necessary to consolidate democratization and the rule of law. The project raises

11. J. Alexander Thier, The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan , 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 556

(2006–2007).
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issues which are currently a matter of substantial scholarly speculation about the
nature of the potential for democracy and Islam throughout the Middle East.12
The authors bring to this pressing subject their considerable expertise and
diverse perspectives, they critically assess the purposes and processes surrounding
the post-conflict constitutionalism project. They also draw upon the significant
country experiences in this latest wave of political and constitutional development. While the contingency of politics will doubtlessly shape the course of events
in Iraq, the cautionary tale that emerges out of this symposium reflects the need
for more systematic thinking about the grounds for the legitimacy of constitutional projects in contemporary global politics.

12. See, e.g., Council on Foreign Relations Study Group: Islam and Democratization: Where Are We

Headed?, http://www.cfr.org/project/1283/study_group.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
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